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INTRODUCTION 
There is a problem with the scope of this interlocutory appeal. It 
was sought, and presumably granted, because the trial court failed to follow 
this Court's ruling in ORS v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, 999 P.3d 572 (Utah 2000). 
The Petition identified the sole issue as: 
Did the trial court err in failing to apply this Court's holdings in 
Houghton II and McCoy9 which require the State to pay an 
attorneys fee where the State recovers its lien from a third-party 
tort recovery produced by the recipient's attorney? 
R. 1767 (emphasis added). Appellees ("the State"), although they filed no 
counterpetition, seek now to consider several non-McCoy issues not addressed 
in Recipient's Brief (e.g., proper notice of claim). It is assumed that the Court 
would like to focus this interlocutory appeal on the issue for which it was 
granted, and that addressing these other issues would be an unnecessary 
distraction. Therefore, unless notified otherwise, Recipients will address only 
briefly the State's collateral issues raised in its Points I, II and III. 
RESPONSE TO THE STATE'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Several allegations in the State's "Statement of the Case" are 
incorrect or seriously misleading. For example, the State claims: 
It was undisputed that the named Class II plaintiffs [sic] attorney 
fees claims failed on the merits. R. 508, 513, 515, 556-58; 
Houghton II, 2002 UT 101 at 1J6. 
-1-
State's Brief at 6 (emphasis added). This is untrue. These claims did not 
'Tail/' but were sustained on the merits: 
[W]e next examine Class II plaintiffs' argument that the district 
court erred in granting the State's motion for summary judgment 
and dismissing their claims for attorney fees with prejudice. . . . 
Class IIplaintiffs ask us to reverse the district court fs grant of 
summary judgment, while the State asks us to simply modify the 
district court's dismissal so as to be without prejudice, [W]e 
are persuaded ... to accept Class II plaintiffs9 proposal. We 
therefore reverse the district court on the issue of attorney fees 
and remand for further discovery. 
Houghton II, •pO (emphasis added). Additionally, the pages cited for this 
"failed on the merits" proposition either reference documents that preceded 
Houghton IIor simply do not support the proposition for which they are cited.1 
The State also claims that 'This Court affirmed the dismissal of 
all of the [Class II] claims... with the exception of the attorney fees claims." 
State's Brief at 5 (emphasis added). This is misleading because the dismissal 
has no negative affect on the attorney fee claims, as implied by this quote. 
Much of the State's recitation of facts and characterization of 
arguments is similarly unreliable. Additional examples appear below in Points 
LA and I.C. 
1
 Four such pages (R. 508,556-8) relate to the Defendant's May, 2000 Motion 
for Summary Judgment, which preceded the Houghton II decision by 2Vi years. 
Further, none of the six pages cited even address the State's 'Tailed on the merits" 
allegations. 
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ARGUMENT 
REPLY POINT I 
- Refusal to Follow McCoy Justifies Appeal -
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO FOLLOW McCOY 
DOES SERIOUS HARM TO THE CLASS, WHICH 
JUSTIFIES THIS APPEAL. THE ISSUES IN THIS 
APPEAL ARE NOT ABSTRACT QUESTIONS SEEKING 
AN ADVISORY OPINION, BUT REPRESENT A REAL 
DISPUTE BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
A. Issues Raised. 
The State's characterization of Plaintiffs' position is inaccurate 
and misleading. The first sentence of the State's Point IV is: 
The only issue raised by the plaintiffs is the proper interpretation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (1998). 
State's Brief at 16 (emphasis added). That is false. Recipients raised six (6) 
separate points, argued over 36 pages, having to do with the proper 
interpretation of McCoy and when the State should be required to pay its fair 
share of attorney fees for obtaining lien reimbursement.2 To characterize 
"[§26-19-7(4) as being] the only issue raised" is therefore rather astonishing. 
2
 Recipients argued that: the "procuring the settlement" triggers the State's 
obligation under McCoy (Point I); there should be no requirement that the State first 
proceed directly against the recipient (Point II); consent to sue should not be a 
requirement (Point III); notice should be required (Point IV); the State's "using its 
own resources [attorney]" argument is an evasion of McCoy (Point V); and recipient 
"cooperation"is met by identifying the third party obligor (Point VI). 
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B. Refusal to Follow McCoy Justifies this Court's Intervention, 
The State's refusal to follow McCoy is illustrated by its persistent 
mischaracterization of the issues and the taking of anti-McCoy positions in 
various forums. This stubborn defiance, combined with the trial court's refusal 
to follow McCoy, threaten to destroy the class and do substantial injustice. 
The trial court's errant ruling dealt specifically with McCoy f 18, 
holding that the State's obligation to pay a fair share of recipient's attorney 
fees occurs only when "the State elects to recover its claim directly from the 
recipient." Judge Quinn's Order, R. 1720 f 1. The trial court thereby rejected 
two McCoy holdings, i.e., that "securing a recovery" triggers the State's 
obligation (McCoy f 18) and that "each method of recovery requires the State 
to pay its share of [a recipient's] attorney fees." McCoy f 19 (emphasis 
added); R. 1588-90, 1720 %l. The failure to follow McCoy in these two key 
respects basically destroys the class and requires immediate correction. 
The threat to the class is very evident in the trial court's "tentative 
ruling" where, because of "misunderstanding" McCoy, the trial court noted 
"[i]t is apparent that regardless of which analytical framework [of McCoy 
interpretation] is adopted, the result is problematicfor continuing this case as 
a class action." R. 1591 (emphasis and bracketed portion added). Because the 
trial court has rejected two key elements of McCoy, has basically destroyed the 
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class, and will probably dismiss the class, it makes sense to resolve these 
interpretation issues now to avoid future appeals. 
At least three McCoy interpretation issues need this Court's 
attention, including the State's continuing claims that: a) it may avoid a 
McCoy fair-share attorneys fee contribution by allegedly using "its own 
resources" (i.e., attorney) (State's Brief at 18; R. 763, R. 1798:44-45); b) its 
"consent" is required before it owes a fair share of attorney fees (State's Brief 
at 18-19; R. 1798:43-44); and c) some heightened "cooperation" by the 
recipient is required. State's Brief at 19; R. 1798:47-86. The fact that the State 
is still raising the "own resources" and "consent" arguments three years after 
they were rejected by McCoy, highlights why this Court needs to be involved 
and resolve these issues now, once and for all. Undaunted by McCoy, the State 
still insists on consent and refuses to pay its fair share, even when settlements 
are procured by the recipients' attorneys. State's Brief at 18-19. 
C. Walker Illustrates State's and Trial Court's Rejection of McCoy. 
The State cites the recent unpublished Court of Appeals case of 
Walker v. ORS, 2004 UT App. 101 (also a Judge Quinn case), as an example 
of a court decision where the State "did not have to reimburse a private 
attorney when it spent its own resources to investigate and seek 
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reimbursement." State's Brief at 18. However, this decision actually 
illustrates the State's and the trial court's continued refusal to follow McCoy. 
The State raised two claims, both rejected by McCoy, to wit: "that 
it should not pay any of Petitioners' attorney fees because it expended its own 
efforts to collect on the lien, and did not consent to Petitioners' 
representation." Walker, p. 1, Introductory Paragraph (emphasis added). This 
persuaded the Court of Appeals, which rationalized: "[a]fter denying consent, 
ORS advised State Farm that Petitioners' counsel did not represent the State's 
claim and demanded directpayment from State Farm." Id. (emphasis added). 
Thus, Walker ignored this Court's McCoy requirement that the law "in no way 
limits the award of fees to recipients who obtain consent" McCoy, % 18 
(emphasis added). 
Walker also held, at State urging, that because the "ORS spent its 
own resources to investigate and seek reimbursement before any request [for 
consent] was made by Petitioners' counsel," no attorney fee was owed. 
Walker, p.l. Thus, Walker refused to follow another McCoy holding that 
"securing a recovery on behalf of his client" triggers the obligation to pay a fair 
share of attorney fees. McCoy % 18. Walker emphasized mechanical, lien-
preservation activities to justify denying a fair share ("on its own initiative, 
ORS discovered the identity of the third party, filed a Notice of Lien, and 
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obtained State Farm's admission of liability," Walker, p. 1), while ignoring the 
substance of who produced the settlement from which the lien was paid. 
Walker is "Exhibit A" for why the Supreme Court needs to 
intervene and "clarify" McCoy. The State has steadfastly refused to follow 
McCoy. It carves out for itself unwarranted "exceptions," and parses words to 
justify its narrow construction of the case. As a result, an incorrect legal 
standard was again adopted by Judge Quinn to unjustly deny a recipient 
reimbursement for a fair share of attorney fees for securing a settlement from 
which the State was paid. It is time for this Court to intervene. 
1>. Advisory Opinion is Not Sought, 
The State accuses Recipients of seeking an advisory opinion as to 
how McCoy "should be interpreted and applied to hypothetical situations." 
State's Brief at 12. The State then mischaracterizes the trial court's order: 
The district court's order dealt solely with what discovery would 
be permitted in relationship with an outstanding motion to 
decertify the class of plaintiffs. 
State's Brief at 12 (emphasis added). Both statements are incorrect. 
Recipients do not seek an advisory opinion, and the district court's order dealt 
with far more than what "discovery" would be permitted. R. 1750-53. 
Examination of the court's order shows that the issues here are not 
"abstract" or "hypothetical," and that "there is an actual conflict between 
-7-
interested parties asserting adverse claims/5 Baird v. State of Utah, 574 P.2d 
713, 715 (Utah 1978). The preamble of the order recites that the court was 
consideringfive (5) separate motions, and in that context "heard oral argument 
on the holding and meaning" of McCoy. R. 1750. The court then notes that 
it has "read the McCoy case and cases related to it, [and] has fully considered 
the oral argument of counsel on the holding and meaning of the McCoy case." 
R. 1751 (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court was viewing the interpretation 
of McCoy as critical to the matters on which he was about to rule. This is 
anything but "hypothetical." 
The trial court then held, relying solely on | 18 of McCoy, that 
class recovery is limited to that narrow band of cases where "the State elects 
to recover its claim directly from the recipient." R.1752. This is hardly 
hypothetical because a "Class II plaintiff is defined as a Medicaid recipient 
who: had a third-party liability claim, retained an attorney to assist in 
obtaining a recovery, and received "settlements or judgments" from which the 
State's Medicaid reimbursement liens were paid.3 R. 82 ]f 1; R. 99-100. When 
the trial court's additional (< recover directly from the recipient" element is 
The noncontroversial parts of this ruling were that the recipient must have 
received limedical assistance [and] hire[d] an attorney to recover damages from a 
third party. " R. 1752 (emphasis added). Everyone agrees with those requirements. 
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added, the class is reduced by about 98-7%. See Point I.E below. That is not 
hypothetical. 
E. Significant, Continuing Damage to the Class. 
The State admitted in a status report that the trial court's "recover 
directly" element reduces the potential class size by 2.933 possibilities (from 
2.974 potentials to a mere 41). R. 1789-90.4 This is a 98.7% reduction in 
potential class size! 
When one considers the balance of the trial court's Order, it is 
very clear how real and justiciable the actual controversy is here. The trial 
court applies its narrow reading of McCoy f 18, holding that "each Class II 
representative and member must meet the requirements of paragraphs of the 
McCoy case as construed above." R. 1752 (emphasis added). In other words, 
with one stroke of the proverbial pen, Class II shrank from every Medicaid 
recipient with a third-party action whose settlement provided lien 
reimbursement to the State (about 2,974 souls) to only cases where "the State 
elects to recover its claim directly from the recipient" (R. 1752), or about 41 
4
 These figures come from the State's status report to the trial court filed in 
January 2004. The potential class possibilities could be considerably higher than the 
State admits, but this will not be known until discovery is allowed. Because of 
objections and appeals, no discovery has been conducted during the nine years of this 
litigation. 
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souls. That 98.7% shrinkage probably explains why the State has struggled so 
mightily all these years to avoid discovery. 
F. Actual Conflict Between Parties, 
The "actual conflict between interested parties" (Baird, 574 P.2d 
at 715) is further obvious when one considers the balance of the Order and its 
effect on how the case will be litigated. Paragraph 3 of the Order granted the 
State's motion for a protective order, preventing discovery on the mass of Class 
II members identified above who had obtained third-party recoveries and who 
did not receive a fair share attorney fees contribution. R.1752 f 3. By the 
same token, plaintiffs5 motions to compel discovery of this information and 
three other related motions were all denied. R. 1752 f^ 4. The court then 
drastically limited discovery to "identification of recipients who fall within the 
holding of the McCoy case as construed by this Order"5 after which the court 
would consider the State's motion for "decertification" of class status. 
R. 1752-53 (emphasis added). Under such conditions, it is astonishing that the 
State could claim that Recipients are seeking an advisory opinion. 
One of the requirements for obtaining an interlocutory appeal is 
that the resolution of the issue "involves substantial rights and may materially 
affect" the litigation. Rule 5(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. If the 
5
 This would be the 41 against whom "the State elects to recover its claim 
directly from the recipient" R. 1751-52; R. 1789-90. 
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McCoy interpretation issue is resolved now, it will vitally affect who is 
included in the class and the relief to be obtained by over 2,900 people. There 
is also a good chance that this Court's ruling on this issue will effectively 
resolve the entire case. 
REPLY POINT II 
- Fiction of "Recover Its Lien" With "Its" Own Resources -
THE STATE DOES NOT USE "ITS OWN RESOURCES" 
TO OBTAIN SETTLEMENTS FOR THE RECIPIENT. BY 
"RECOVER ITS LIEN," THE STATE MEANS THAT IT 
GETS THE TORTFEASOR'S INSURANCE COMPANY TO 
PAY THE LIEN DIRECTLY TO THE STATE, AFTER THE 
SETTLEMENT IS OBTAINED BY A RECIPIENT'S 
LAWYER. 
A. What the State Means by "Recover Its Lien." 
The State explains its position as follows: 
Plaintiffs ask this Court to amend McCoy to require the State of 
Utah to pay private attorney fees even if the state recovers its lien 
directly from a third party and not from the Medicaid recipient 
. . . Plaintiffs ask . . . that the State . . . be required to pay the 
attorney fees for a private counsel who did not assist in the 
State's recovery. ... [S]uch a rule would encourage the State of 
Utah to never seek to recover its lien from the liable third party. 
The State [should not] have to pay for a private attorney whose 
services it did not use . . . when it spent its own resources to 
investigate and seek reimbursement. 
State's Brief at 17-18 (emphasis, double emphasis and brackets added). By 
"recover its lien" with "its own resources," the State means the mechanical 
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process of getting money transferred from the tortfeasor to the State, after the 
recipient has settled. It does not mean procuring the settlement from which 
the lien is ultimately paid. In other words, if the State denies the recipient's 
attorney consent to prosecute its claim and sends the insurance company 
notice of its lien, the State deems that it "recovers its [own] lien/' even though 
the recipient's attorney did all the work to secure the settlement. 
B. False Impression. 
The State promotes this as a no-brainer fairness issue: in essence, 
why should the State pay a share of recipient's attorney fees when the State 
"recovers its lien" with "its own resources"? Interestingly, the language in the 
State's Brief is parsed very carefully. It conveys the impression of State 
settlement procurement without actually making the assertion. The impression 
left by a quick read of the quoted passage is that the State's agents did the work 
("spent its own resources") to generate a settlement ("recovers its lien"), from 
which the recipient somehow gets a free ride ("pay for a private attorney") by 
unjustly recovering a share of his/her attorney fees at State expense ("whose 
services it did not use"). 
Why is this "impression" false? The State virtually never 
"procures a settlement" (or judgment). Recipients' counsel, as an officer of the 
court, can represent to this Court that in 30 years of personal injury practice 
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(1974-2004), he has never seen a single instance where the State has "procured 
a settlement" from a third-party tortfeasor in a Medicaid reimbursement case.6 
R. 1798:62. In nine years of litigation in this case, counsel does not recall any 
specific assertion by the State that it actually "procures settlements,5' but it does 
leave that impression. 
Typical fact patterns of Class II members would be similar to 
those in McCoy and Walker. In McCoy, the recipient was injured in July, 1993 
in a fall at K-Mart. He could not pay his medical bills so he received medical 
assistance from the State in the amount of $8,800. McCoy f 2. The recipient 
contacted and retained Attorney John McCoy, who immediately contacted the 
ORS requesting consent to bring the action. The ORS declined consent in 
July, 1994, "stating that ORS would seek full recovery directly from any liable 
third parties," and then sent a lien notice to K-Mart. McCoy % 3. The ORS 
then sent a lien notice to K-Mart. McCoy U 3. A year later, in July 1995, two 
years after the accident, McCoy demanded settlement from the property 
owner's insurer, and eventually settled the case in October, 1995, about 2/4 
years after injury. McCoy Tflf 4, 5. The State did nothing to "secure the 
settlement," but claimed that "McCoy lacked consent" and that it was free to 
"demand[] payment from the recipient's settlement proceeds... [and] does not 
6
 Nor has counsel ever heard of this occurring from the many other attorneys 
he knows who practice similar law. 
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have to pay a share of McCoy's attorney fees in securing that settlement." 
McCoy If 15. History repeats itself, as these are the same claims made in 
Walker and Houghton II 
Basically, when the State withholds consent, but gets paid at the 
end of a case from the efforts of the recipient's counsel, the State defines this 
as having "recovered its own lien" by using "its own resources," adroitly 
evading the requirements of McCoy that consent is not necessary and that 
"each method of recovery requires the State to pay its share of [a recipient's] 
attorney fees." McCoy-ff 18,19 (emphasis added). The State justifies this as 
"recovering its lien" rather than "recovering a settlement." If this 
rationalization is accepted, McCoy is meaningless for most recipients. 
C. Securing Settlement Should Trigger the Obligation, 
The basic difference between the State's approach and the 
McCoy/Recipients' approach is what triggers the State's obligation to share 
the recipient's attorney fees. The McCoy/Recipients' approach is that the 
recipient is "entitled to recover attorney fees from the State for procuring the 
settlement" McCoy \ 13 (emphasis added). McCoy characterizes Utah Code 
Ann. § 26-19-7(4), the authorizing statute, as having a "relatively broad reach." 
McCoy | 18. The McCoy court noted that it would be "inherently unfair not 
to award attorney fees to McCoy, who ha[d] followed the requirements of the 
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Act in securing a recovery on behalf of his client." McCoy f 18 (emphasis 
added). The trigger is "securing a recovery." 
On the other hand, the State takes the position that "securing a 
recovery" does not trigger the obligation to share attorney fees, but only the 
State's "consent" can trigger the obligation to share attorney fees. The 
obligation is never triggered, according to the State, if the State notifies the 
tortfeasor's insurance company of its lien and demands direct payment, even 
if the actual settlement from which its lien is paid is generated entirely by 
the recipient's counsel. 
This Court should reject the State's approach for several reasons. 
First, stare decisis should prevail. McCoy has already decided this issue, 
holding that "each method of recovery requires the State to pay its share of [a 
recipient's] attorney fees." McCoy f 19 (emphasis added). Second, justice and 
sound public policy require that attorney fees reimbursement be based on 
something of real economic substance, i.e., for "securing a recovery on behalf 
of his client" {McCoy % 18), as opposed to filing a lien notice. Incidentally, 
this is in keeping with many other areas of law where attorney fee payments by 
government agencies or insurance companies as a "cost of procurement" are 
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very common.7 In fact, virtually all State Medicaid statutory schemes provide 
specifically for payment of attorney fees.8 
A third reason to reject the State's approach is that it creates a 
needless legal fiction that is not based on economic reality or justice. The State 
claims it should not "have to pay for a private attorney whose services it did 
not use" to "recover its lien/' all the while receiving the proceeds from the 
settlement secured by the recipient! Such a fiction enthrones form over 
substance and undoes the justice of the McCoy case. Fourth, this approach 
makes McCoy exceptionally easy to evade by the State arbitrarily withholding 
7
 See, for example, Esquivel v. Labor Com 'n of Utah, 2000 UT 66,7 P.3d 777, 
782 (Utah 2000) (in a third party recovery by injured worker in worker's 
compensation context, "the employer or insurer must.. . bear a proportionate share 
of the expenses for obtaining the recovery5'); Stewart v. Utah Public Service Com fn, 
885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994) ("a court has inherent equitable power to award 
reasonable attorney fees when it deems it appropriate in the interest of justice and 
equity"); and Cochran v. U.S. Healthcare Financing Administration, 291 F.3d 775, 
778 (11th Cir. 2002) ("Medicare regulations . . . provide that, when Medicare is 
reimbursed out of a judgment or settlement, the amount of money it takes is reduced 
by pro-rata share of the 'procurement costs5 which include attorneys' fees of the 
judgment or settlement. 42 C.F.R. § 411.37(c) (2002)") (emphasis added). 
8
 See, for example, New Jersey Stat. § 30-4D-7.1(b) (2004): Every recipient 
or his attorney must promptly pay the full proceeds of the settlement against a third 
party "subject to a pro rata deduction for counsel fees, costs, or other expenses 
incurred by the recipient or the recipient's attorney"; and Vernon's Annotated 
Missouri Statutes 208.215.9(1): The amount of the lien recovery is subject to 
"subtracting from the gross amount of the recovery the total attorney's fees and other 
costs incurred by the recipient incident to the recovery"; a court shall determine 
whether Medicaid "should, as a matter of fairness and equity, bear its proportionate 
share of the fees and costs incurred to generate the recovery." 
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consent, "notifying" the tortfeasor's insurer of its lien, and simply waiting for 
the recipient to do the work to generate the money. The State's position 
reflects a disdainful rejection of McCoy and is impractical, unworkable and 
unfair. 
D. Possible Exceptions? 
Hypothetically, what if the State could prove that it did in fact 
secure an actual settlement (as opposed to simply "recovering its lien" after the 
recipient procures the settlement)? The answer is simple: such a recipient is 
not a class member and would not be entitled to a fair share of attorney fees. 
Having said this, Recipients urge caution here, should the Court's 
opinion address this issue. Any language in the opinion so holding would have 
to be exceptionally clear, and require that the State would have to actually 
generate the underlying settlement, not just payment of the lien. Because of 
the history of this case, Recipients suggest that the State should have the 
burden of proving that it generated the actual settlement, and that there be a 
strong presumption that the recipient generated the settlement where the 
recipient has counsel before an offer of settlement is made. Without such 
clarifications, the history of the case suggests that the State would use this 
exception to swallow the rule, and attempt to defeat commonality and destroy 
the class. 
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REPLY POINT III 
- Notice Was Adequate in All Respects -
CLASS II PLAINTIFFS, THOUGH NOT REQUIRED, 
PROVIDED NOTICE THAT COMPLIED WITH THE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. THE STATE 
WAIVED ANY TECHNICAL DEFECTS IN THE NOTICE. 
EVERY CLASS MEMBER IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE 
NAMED IN A NOTICE. 
A. Procedural Note. 
The issues raised by the State with respect to notice were briefed 
extensively below (R. 924-35), argued to and denied by Judge Nehring 
(R. 1798: 1-42, 82), and not revisited by Judge Quinn. R. 1583-92; R. 1718-
21. The State never sought interlocutory appeal on this issue, but simply raised 
it in State's Brief at 8-12. There is not enough space in this Reply Brief to 
folly address these notice issues in the detail in which they were addressed 
below. A 30-or-so page response is found below in R. 1618-27 and 1614-38, 
which is incorporated herein by reference if the Court wishes more detail and 
case authority. Otherwise, the following constitute the highlights of what was 
presented. 
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B. Notice of Claim Not Required for Non-Injury or Equitable Actions. 
The Notice of Claim9 in this case was filed only as a precaution, 
to avoid unnecessary delay. R. 835. Notice under the Governmental Immunity 
Act is only required for a defined "injury." See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 
(1991). "Injury" means "death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of 
property." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(5). For example, a "claim for an 
adjustment on .. . property taxes is neither an 'injury' as defined in § 63-30-
2(6) nor is it an 'action under this act.'" Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1154 
(Utah 1983). "[E]quitable claims of this nature for assessments made 'without 
authority of law,' are exempt from the notice requirements." Jenkins, 675 P.2d 
at 1154. Class II Plaintiffs in this case seek return of monies wrongfully taken 
by the State, which is not a defined "injury" and is "equitable" in nature. 
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. 1989, p. 482,484. Accordingly, Recipients are 
exempt from notice requirements. 
C. Adequate Notice Given: Strict Compliance Observed, 
The State incorrectly claims the notice was insufficient because 
it "did not assert a claim for attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-
7(4) (1998)/' State's Brief at 11. This is a serious misstatement of fact and 
law. All that is required of a notice of claim is a ubrief statement of the facts/' 
9
 The full notice served about July 19, 1995, contained a signed specimen 
complaint of over 30 pages in length. See R. 834-72. 
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a setting forth of "the nature of the claim asserted," and a statement of "the 
damages incurred . . . so far as they are known." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
1 l(3)(a). The statute does not require an exact statutory cite, as alleged by the 
State. "There must be enough specificity in the notice to inform as to the 
nature of the claim so that the defendant can appraise its potential liability." 
Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990). The "nature of the 
claim" is simple: 
Claimants demand . . . any interest, costs and attorneys fees as 
will reasonably place the claimants in the position they would 
have been had the State not taken their property. 
R. 837 f 14 (emphasis added). 
The Notice incorporates by reference "a more detailed statement 
of facts . . . [in] the attached draft of a complaint,... Exhibit 'A' which the 
claimants intend to file." R. 836 f 9 (emphasis added). There are multiple 
additional claims for attorney fees in the "draft complaint."10 For example, 
f 53 states: "Plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys9 fees as may be provided by 
law, including 42 U.S.C. § 1988." R. 852 (emphasis added). Paragraph 133 
asks for an award of "a reasonable attorneys fee" and that "Plaintiffs are 
entitled to not only a reasonable attorneys fee, but reasonable expert fees." 
10
 It should be noted that the draft "complaint" attached to this notice (R. 83 8-
872) was not filed at that time. An almost identical version with the same 133 
allegations was filed later, after the 90 days had expired. R. 1-39. 
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R. 870. In the ad damnum clause, fflf 8 and 10 each request "attorneys5 fees as 
allowed by law." R. 871-72. 
Clearly, this Notice suffices to advise the State that Recipients 
were asking for attorney fees. Judge Nehring found it adequate. R. 1798: 82. 
The State cites no authority requiring citation to an exact Code provision. This 
Notice clearly identified "attorney fees" as part of "the nature of the claim 
asserted" and "the damages . . . so far as they are known" and was sufficient 
under the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a). The State misconstrues 
"strict compliance" with the Act, which refers not to the form of notice, but to 
such things as the timely filing of the notice, service on the appropriate person, 
etc. Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, 40 P.3d 632, 635-37 (Utah 2002) 
("strict compliance" is failure to verify a notice under oath; filing a claim one 
day late; and failure to file the claim with the appropriate official). 
D. State Waived Right to Object to Form of the Notice, 
The State believes that the form of the notice is "jurisdictional," 
that the notice is somehow deficient in form, and this is therefore fatal to 
plaintiffs5 claims. State Brief at 8. This is wrong. Some aspects of notice are 
jurisdictional, but not the form of the notice. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
held that the requirement of notice is not jurisdictional, but an affirmative 
defense. Hart v. Salt Lake Co, Com'n, 945 P.2d 125, 132 (Utah App. 1997). 
The defense may be waived if not raised under Rule 12(h), Utah R.Civ.P. 
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Olpin v. Grove Fin. Co., 521 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1974). "Immunity is an 
affirmative defense which must be proved by the defendant/' and may be lost 
if not proved by defendant. Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 
1996). In Hart, Salt Lake County had waived the governmental immunity 
affirmative defense. Hart, 945 P.2d at 133. 
An examination of the defendants' original Answer reveals that 
there is no specific raising of the alleged failure of the form of the notice. 
R. 66-77. Governmental immunity is raised only generally in the Fifth and 
Sixth Defenses. The Fifth and Sixth Defenses are merely boilerplate defenses 
that deal with the strict compliance issues, which are obviously met herein. 
There is no mention in the Sixth Defense of any defective notice, or anything 
remotely similar to what the State raises in its motion. R. 74-75. Accordingly, 
the governmental immunity affirmative defense has been waived. 
E. Naming of Every Class Member Not Required. 
The State argues incorrectly that the notice is insufficient because 
it does not "contain the names of all plaintiffs" (State's Brief at 9) and cites 
Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17,42 P.3d 379 (Utah 2002). 
The case is clearly distinguishable because the notice there had the names of 
only two of the five plaintiffs named in the Complaint. The Court held that the 
failure to name the other three individual plaintiffs on the notice of claim 
resulted in a lack of jurisdiction for those plaintiffs. Pigs Gun Club, however, 
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did not deal with a class of plaintiffs, like the instant case, where the named 
class representatives filed a timely notice of claim that was effective for all 
class members. The very reason class action lawsuits are allowed is to 
facilitate claims where "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members 
is impracticable." Rule 23(a), Utah R.Civ.P. As a practical matter, the State's 
position would repeal Rule 23(a) because it would be virtually impossible to 
discover and name every potential class member in a governmental immunity 
notice. Pigs Gun Club did not intend that result. 
The State's claims also run counter to other Utah Supreme Court 
precedents. For example, in Stewart v. Utah Publ Serv. Comm yn, 885 P.2d 
759, 782 (Utah 1994), the court sustained "a class action against the state for 
a monetary award that benefitted the entire class" (emphasis added). In Plumb 
v. State, 809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990), the Court dealt with the thrift scandal of 
the late 1980fs. Plumb, as a named plaintiff, represented a class consisting of 
approximately 7,000 persons holding 17,000 accounts in five failed Utah thrift 
institutions, all with claims against the State. It was apparently clear as a 
matter of law that these claims were not barred by governmental immunity. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's ruling has a tremendously adverse negative 
impact on the class of claimants in this certified class action. It reduces the 
class by about 98.7% and thus presents an actual conflict between the parties. 
The trial court has declined to follow McCoy, which requires the 
State to contribute to a successful recipient's attorney fees when the recipient's 
attorney secures a settlement from which the State's lien is paid. 
Although notice was not required to be filed in this case, it was 
filed and adequately disclosed a claim for attorney fees. 
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